Abstract-False data injection attack and PDoS (path-based Denial of Service) attack are serious threats in wireless sensor networks. Existing schemes can effectively resist false data injection and PDoS attacks, but most of them can not find out the compromised node when the base station or sink node detect the report is invalid. In this paper, we propose a false data injection-resilient security routing protocol (FDISRP) based on bilinear pairings and different operation. The proposed protocol can resist false data injection and PDoS attacks, and if the report R is invalid, the proposed protocol can carry out the relative algorithm to find out the compromised node. The performance analysis shows that our scheme is lower in storage requirement than the others scheme, and with the number of fabricated report packet and the number of hops for report packet forwarding increasing, the energy savings significantly increasing also.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the great advancement in micro electrical mechanical systems and wireless communication technologies, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely used in environmental monitoring, military, health care, and surveillance. Wireless sensor networks are composed of hundreds and thousands of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes monitor a wide variety of environment conditions, and transmit the sensing data to a sink node or the base station for further analysis. Wireless sensor networks may be deployed in the security-sensitive environments, such as the war field, and sensor nodes can collaboratively perform dangerous tasks in the unreachable or uncontrollable areas. Thus, the sensor nodes may be compromised, the adversary can inject the false data into the sensing data through the compromised nodes, and the invalid data packet will be forward to the base station along the hop, which can not only deceive the base station but also deplete the limited resource of wireless sensor networks. Due to the transmission range of each sensor node is limited, communication sessions between two nodes are usually established through multihop, and the adversary can send the fabricated data to nodes so as to waste the energy of forwarding nodes, this attack is called path-based DoS [6] . Therefore, how to resist false data injection and PDoS attacks is very import in wireless sensor networks.
Many scholars have been done much research work on how to resist false data injection and PDoS attacks in wireless sensor networks [1] [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . But most of them can not find out and remove the compromised node when the base station or sink node detect the report is invalid, and the compromised node can continue to inject the false data into the network and launch the other attacks.
In this paper, we propose a false data injection-resilient security routing protocol (FDISRP) based on bilinear pairings and different operation. The proposed protocol can resist false data injection and PDoS attacks, and if the report R is invalid, the proposed protocol can carry out the relative algorithm to find out the compromised node.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related work is introduced in section 2, the section 3 introduces bilinear pairing and gap Diffie-Hellman group, the section 4 is the description of FDISRP, the security, and performance analysis of the new scheme are discussed in section 5 and 6, the section 7 is the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Many scholars have been done much research work on how to resist false data injection and PDoS attacks in wireless sensor networks.
In [4] , A Statistical en-route filtering mechanism (SEF) was proposed by F. Ye et al to detect and drop false reports during the forwarding process, in SEF, each forwarding node generates a MAC(message authentication code) and multiple MACs are attached to the event report, each node along the way verified the correctness of the MACs probabilistically and drops the event report with invalid MACs. However, due to its design strategy, only a few intermediate nodes have the ability to check the validity of forwarding messages.
In 2004, An interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme for filtering of injected false data was proposed by Zhu et al [11] , in this scheme, any data change between two associated nodes was considered as false data injection, and the scheme can guarantee that the base station can detect a false report when no more than t nodes are compromised.
In [7] , Z. Yu and Y. Guan proposed a dynamic enroute filtering scheme for false data injection attacks in wireless sensor networks, in this scheme, a legitimate report is endorsed by multiple sensing nodes using their own authentication keys generated from one-way hash chains, in filtering phase, each forwarding node validates the authenticity of the reports and drops those false ones. In order to reduce the chance of authentication keys being reused by the adversary, each node periodically updates its authentication key. To guarantee the forwarding nodes closer to a cluster hold more authentication keys for the cluster, the cluster head uses Hill Climbing approach to disseminate the authentication keys of sensing nodes to the forwarding nodes along multiple paths toward the base station.
In 2007, Vinod Shukla and Daji Qiao proposed a secure statistical scheme (SSTF) [12] , SSTF is able to distinguish transient data from false data in most scenarios, if only the current sensed readings are reported by individual sensors, it is very difficult to distinguish transient data from false data, and SSTF requires the cluster head to perform a series of carefully-designed inter-sensor tests on both readings and digests reported by individual sensors.
Christoph Krauß et al proposed a Secure Ticket-Based En-route Filtering Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks (STEF) [1] , the scheme uses the typical operation mode of query-response, if the reply messages contain a valid ticket issued by the base station, the reply messages will be forwarded, if not, the reply messages will be dropped.
In [8] , a one-way key chain authentication based enroute filtering scheme for wireless sensor networks (KAEF) was proposed by T. Yuan et al. In this scheme, each sensor node is preloaded with a one-way key chain for endorsing reports. Each cluster head sends the commitments of the key chains along its path towards the sink. Each legitimate sensing report is collectively endorsed by multiple sensor nodes using a one-way key chain, any en-route node that stores such a commitment is able to verify a report endorsed by a key in the same key chain as the commitment.
In [9] , geographical information based false reports filtering scheme (GFFS) in sensor networks was proposed by Z. LIU and J. WANG. After deployment, each node sends its location information to other nodes. The legitimate sensing report must carry not only MACs from t detecting nodes with distinct key partitions, but also locations of these nodes. Each en-node checks not only the correctness of the MAC and the locations carried in the report, but also the legitimacy of the locations. The scheme can resist collaborative false data injection attacks, but, obtaining the geographical information of the node depletes the sensor nodes resources.
Yu et al. proposes a grouping-based resilient statistical en-route filtering scheme (GRSEF) for filtering false data [10] . GRSEF divide sensor nodes into T groups, which ensure any position in the monitoring area can be covered simultaneously by T nodes from distinct groups with high probability, and GRSEF introduces a multi-axis division technique to tackle the threshold limitation without relying on the sink stationarity and routing mechanism. GRSEF efficiently avoids introducing redundant groups and achieves the independence on the sink stationarity and routing protocols, but each sensor node stores a large number of keys, and the adversary only need compromise small amount nodes which can make the security protocol failure.
The proposed schemes can efficient resist false data injection and PDoS attacks in wireless sensor networks, but most of them can not find out and remove the compromised node, and the compromised node can continue to inject the false data into the network and launch the other attacks.
III. BILINEAR PAIRING
We briefly review the bilinear pairing and gap DiffieHellman group [5] . G 1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q and G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q, the bilinear pairing e is defined as e:
The bilinear pairing has to satisfy the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: ①For all P，Q ， R ∈G 1 ， such that e (P,Q+R)=e (P,Q)e (P,R)，e(P+Q,R)=e (P,R)e (Q,R); ②For all P,Q∈G 1 ，a,b∈G 1 ，such that e (aP,bQ) =e (P, Q) ab =e (abP,Q) =e (P, abQ); (2) Non-degenerate: there exists P, Q∈ G 1 Such that e (P, Q) ≠1.
(3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q) for all P, Q∈ G 1 . No probabilistic polynomial algorithm can solve the linear e-one-way hash problem.
Subsequently, we describe some mathematical problems in relation to bilinear pairing.
(1) Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two elements P, Q∈G 1 , to compute an integer n, such that Q = nP, is called the DLP. We assume that DLP in both G 1 and G 2 should be hard.
(2) Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): Given (P, aP, bP, cP ), where P∈G 1 , and a, b, c∈G 1 , DDHP is to determine whether c = ab mod q or not.
(3) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given (P, aP, bP ), where P ∈G 1 and a, b ∈G 1 , CDHP is to compute abP.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF FDISRP

A. Assumptions and Notations
We assume that the wireless sensor network is composed of base station and sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are limited in their storage, computational, and communication resource, the base station is not resource constrained, and is assumed to be uncompromised at all times. It is assumed that an adversary can eavesdrop on all traffic, inject packets, or replay old packets. If a sensor node is compromised, all the information it holds will be known to the adversary. We assume that the neighbor nodes can sense the same message. The nodes send message to the base station according to the base station's query message. The notations used in our protocol are listed in table 1. The proposed protocol consists five phases: System Deployment and Initialization, Query from base station, Report Generation, En-route Filtering, and Verification.
B. System Deployment and Initialization
1) The system selects k, q, G 1 , G 2 , e：G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 , H(.): {0, 1}→G 1 , as the system parameters.
2) The system randomly selects a number ID bs as the unique identity of BS, calculates Q bs =H(ID i ), for each sensor node i, selects a number ID i as the unique identity of the node i, calculates Q i =H(ID i ), calculates S i =kQ i =kH(ID i ), and saves (Q bs , ID i , Q i , S i ) to the node i.
3) The base station holds the k and all the (Q i , S i ) 4) The system deploys the sensor nodes to the location.
C. Query from Base Station
When the base station wants to get some message form the node q, it will send a query to the node q as following:
1) The base station calculates K bs q =e(H(Q q ), kH(Q bs )), the K bs q is the secret key shared between base station and the node q.
2) The base station chooses a random number QUERYID as the unique query identity from base station to the sensor node q, and generates the query message Q and a timestamp T 1 .
3) The base station generates the query message packet, <QUERYID, H(Q q ), E(K bs q ,Q||T 1 ) >, and sends this packet to the node q.
4) The intermediate nodes store the QUERYID to the memory.
D. Report Generation
1) When the node q receives the query message packet, it computes the secret share key K q,bs = e(S q , H(Q bs ))=e(kH(Q q ), H(Q bs ))= e(H(Q q ), H(Q bs )) k = e(H(Q q ), kH(Q bs ))= K bs q with the base station, and decrypts the message E(K bs q ,Q||T 1 ) by the secret key K q,bs , if the T 1 is under the reasonable limits, the node q generates the report R according to the query message Q.
2) Node q sends the report R, the H(Q q ) and a timestamp T 2 to all his neighbor nodes i (i=1…m), m denotes the number of neighbor nodes.
q→i: <R, H(Q q ), T 2 > 3) After receiving the message, all the neighbor nodes i compute the secret share key K i,q = e(S i , H(Q q )) with the node q, calculate the M i =h(R|| K i,q || T 2 ), and send the M i and H(Q i ) to the node q.
i→q: <M i =h(R|| K i,q || T 2 ), H(Q i )) 4) After receiving the message of all his neighbor nodes, the node q calculates M q = h(R|| K q,bs || T 2 ), and 
E. En-route Filtering
When all intermediate nodes receive the report packet, each intermediate node would check to see if it has stored the unique identity QUERYID, if not, the packet will be dropped. Otherwise, the intermediate calculates the hash value of the EndMessage, y=h'(EndMessage), and checks if y= =h(EndMessage). If yes, the EndMessage is valid and the report packet <QUERYID, EndMessage, h(EndMessage), (H(Q q ), H(Q 1 ),…,H(Q m )), E(K q bs , R||T 2 )> will be forwarded to the next intermediate node.
In order to save memory, the identity QUERYID will be deleted if the report packet is forwarded or the report packet does not arrive within a certain period of time.
F. Verification 1) BS verification
After receiving the report packet form the node q, the BS will verify the valid of the report R form the node q as following.
Step1: decrypts the message E(K q bs , R||T 2 ) by the secret key K bs,q =K q,bs , gets R and T 2 . If the T 2 is beyond the reasonable limits, BS will drop the report packet.
Step2: computes the secret share key between the node q and the q's neighbor nodes by the k and H(Q 1 ),…,H(Q m ).
Step3: computes EndMessage'= h(R|| K q,bs || T 2 )
Step4: checks if EndMessage'= = EndMessage, if yes, BS receives the report packet and informs the node q that the report is valid, otherwise, BS drops the report packet and informs the node q to carry out relative verification to find out who is compromised node. The detailed process is described in Algorithm 1. 5: the report R is invalid, and informs the node q to carry out the algorithm 2.
6: end if
2) Node q verification When the q node receives the information coming from the base station, if the report R is valid, in order to save memory, the q node will delete all relative messages with the report packet, if the report R is invalid, the q node will carry out the verification.
The node q computes the secret share key K q,i =e(H(Q i ),S q ) with his neighbor nodes by the H(Q 1 ),…, H(Q i ), computes M i '= h(R|| K q,i || T 2 ), checks if M i '= = M i , if not, the neighbor node i is compromised node, the detailed process is described in Algorithm 2. 
V. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Data Confidentiality
When the adversary obtains the message of the node q sending to base station, it can get E(K q bs , R||T 2 ) , but he has no the secret share key K q,bs , it can not decrypt the message E(K q bs , R||T 2 ), and can not obtain the report R, so this scheme can ensures data confidentiality.
B. Resilience against False Data Injection Attack
When the adversary obtains the report packet <QUERYID, EndMessage, h(EndMessage), (H(Q q ), H(Q 1 ),…,H(Q m )), E(K q bs , R||T 2 )>, the adversary can not amend any message of the report packet to deceive the base station, because it has no the secret share key K i q , between the node q and node q's neighbor nodes, also has no the secret share key K q bs , between the node q and the base station.
If the adversary compromises less than m+1 nodes, m denotes the number of the node q's neighbor nodes. The compromised node i can generate a false data M i '=h(R'|| K i,q || T 2 ), and sends (M i '=h(R'|| K i,q || T 2 ) , H(Q i )) to node q, the node q will generate EndMessage'
, and sends to the base station, it will be detected after the base station carries out the algorithm 1.
C. Resilience against False Endorsement Attack
In most schemes of defending against false data injection attack for wireless sensor networks [1] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] , they can verify the validity of the report R, but when the report R is invalid, they can not find out who is compromised node. In our scheme, if the report R is invalid, the q node can carry out the Algorithm 2 to find out the compromised node.
D. Resilience Against Path-based DoS (PDoS) Attack
The adversary can not launch the PDos attack by injecting false data, because he can not forge the report packet without the secret share key K i q , between the node q and node q's neighbor nodes, also has no the secret share key K q bs , between the node q and the base station.
The adversary can not launch the PDos attack by sending multiple copies of legitimate report packet. The intermediate nodes will delete the QUERYID after the report packet is forwarded or the report packet does not arrive within a certain period of time, when the adversary sends multiple copies of legitimate report packet, the intermediate node will drop the packet because he has no the unique identity QUERYID in his memory.
VI. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Storage Requirements
In this section, we show storage requirements. Whereas the base station has unlimited computation ability and storage, we do not take the memory cost of the base station.
In our scheme, each sensor node must save the hash value Q bs of the base station, the node's own identity ID i , Q i , and S i to his memory in System Deployment and Initialization phase. Each node needs save QUERYID to his memory in the phase of Query from base station. The secret share symmetric key, the identity hash value of node q's neighbor nodes, and the relative messages of the report packet generated in the phase of Report Generation will be delete after verification phase. Let w denotes the average number of neighbors of a node, let L IDbs , L ID , L Q , L S , L QUERYID denote the length of the base station identity, the node identity, Q i =H(ID i ), S i =kQ i =kH(ID i ), and the QUERYID, w denotes the average number of neighbors of a node. The storage requirements RS for a sensor node are: SR= L IDbs + L ID + L Q + L S + w*L QUERYID , suppose each sensor node has 6 neighbor nodes on average, the length of a node and base station identity is 10 bits, the length of hash value and the L Q is 64bits, the storage requirements RS for a sensor node is RS=10+10+64+64+6*64=532Bits=66.5bytes.
In scheme [1] , the storage requirements RS for a sensor node is:
and L h denote the length of a node identity, a symmetric key, QID, and a hash value, w denotes the average number of neighbors of a node, v denotes the average number of stored (QID,c') tuples. Suppose each sensor node has 6 neighbor nodes on average, the length of each key and hash value is 64bits and the length of a node identity is 10 bits, and has to store an average of 5 (QID,c') tuples, the SR=6*10+7*64+5*(64+64)=1148 bits=143.5Bytes. In scheme [2] , the storage requirements RS for a sensor node is: SR=SR H +u*( SR v +L ID )+v*( L R + L T +w*( L H + L ID )). The SR H denotes the length of the hash chain, SR v denotes storage requirements for verification value for one node, u denotes the number of nodes in the cluster, v and w denote the average number of endorsement sets a node stores and the number of endorsements for one specific report, L ID denotes the length of a node identifier, L H and L T denote the length of a cluster head and a timestamp. If u=6, v=2 and w=6, the SR=9504+6*((80+64) +10)+2(192+29+5*(64+10))=11610Bits=1451.25Bytes. In scheme [3] , the storage requirements RS for a sensor node is:
, and b=10, SR=290Bytes for each intermediate node, SR+ L k + L r =306Bytes for cluster head. Table 2 depicts the contrast of the storage requirements between our scheme and others schemes. Table 2 shows that the storage requirements of our scheme is lower than others schemes. 
B. Energy Consumption
In this section, we analyze the energy consumption of our scheme. We use the analysis model similar to that used in scheme [1] and [4] . Let m denotes the average number of neighbors of a node, let L Q , L QUERYID denote the length of the Q i =H(ID i ) and the QUERYID. Let L e , L h denote the length of a report by encrypted and a hash value. In our scheme, energy consumption of sensor nodes mainly is to receive and send the report packet. The format of the report packet is <QUERYID, EndMessage, h(EndMessage), (H(Q q ), H(Q 1 ),…,H(Q m )), E(K q bs , R||T 2 )>. So, the length of a report packet is L t = L QUERYID + L h + L h +(m+1)* L h + L e . When a intermediate node receives a report packet from another node, a fabricated report packet will be drop after verifying, and the legitimate report packet will be forwarded, thus, the energy consumption in our scheme is E t =n*(L t *(e r +e s )+e v )+w*(L t *(e r )+e v ), where n, w denote the average number of hops and the number of fabricated report packet, the e r ,e s , denote the energy consumption of receiving and sending 1 byte report packet, the e v denotes the energy consumption of hash computation to verify a report packet. Without our scheme, all the packet, include the legitimate and fabricated packet, will be forwarded to the base station along all the hops, therefore, the energy consumption without our scheme is Et'= n*Le *(er+es)(1+w).
Let m=4, e r =12.5µJ, e s =16.25µJ, e v =15µJ, L QUERYID =64Bits L h =64Bits, L e =24Bytes, the figure1 depicts the energy consumption depend on the number of fabricated report packet with and without our scheme when the number of hops is 100, the figure1 shows that the energy savings significantly increase with the number of fabricated report packet increasing.
The figure2 depicts the energy consumption depend on the number of hops for report packet forwarding with and without our scheme when the number of fabricated report packet is 5. The figure2 shows that the energy savings significantly increase with the number of hops increasing. 
VII. CONCLUSION
False data injection attack and path-based DoS (PDoS) attack are serious threats in wireless sensor networks, such attacks not only can deceive the base station but also deplete the sensor nodes resources. In this paper, we propose compromised node traceback security routing protocol based on bilinear pairings and different operation. The proposed protocol can resist false data injection and PDoS attacks, and if the report R is invalid, the q node can carry out the relative algorithm to find out the compromised node. The performance analysis shows that our scheme is lower in storage requirement than the others scheme, and with the number of fabricated report packet and the number of hops for report packet forwarding increasing, the energy savings significantly increasing also.
